Karl Popper published, in 1968, a paper that allegedly found a flaw in a very influential article of Birkhoff and von Neumann, which pioneered the field of "quantum logic". Nevertheless, nobody rebutted Popper's criticism in print for several years. This has been called in the historiographical literature an "unsolved historical issue". Although Popper's proposal turned out to be merely based on misinterpretations, and was eventually abandoned by the author himself, this paper aims at providing a resolution to such historical open issues. I show that (i) Popper's paper was just the tip of an iceberg of a much vaster campaign conducted by Popper against quantum logic (which encompassed several more unpublished papers that I retrieved); and (ii) that Popper's paper stimulated a heated debate that remained however confined within private correspondence.
influential essay entitled Quantum Mechanics without the Observer (Popper, 1967). 1 Contingently, at the beginning of 1968, Popper got aware that the aforementioned paper by Birkhoff and von Neumann had, by that time, initiated a new subfield of fundamental research in quantum physics, in the spirit of Copenhagen interpretation, known as the "logic of quantum mechanics" (LQM, or "lattice-theoretical approach" to QM, or simply "quantum logic"). His hostile reaction emerges from a letter that he sent to his friend and renown cosmologist, Hermann Bondi: I have only heard by accident quite recently that the Birkhoff-von Neumann paper has meanwhile become 'the by now classical work' […] , and a school of quantum physicists take it very seriously, and build all sorts of horrible theories on it. (Letter from Popper to Bondi, February 8th, 1968. PA, 96/3) Popper refers here to the prominent "school" of Joseph Maria Jauch in Geneva, which -starting from the early 1960s-revived Birkhoff and von Neumann's approach and led quantum logic to become rather influential. 2 The present paper aims at reconstructing Popper's reactions to the raising of the impact of LQM, in the context of his broader and decades-long critique of Copenhagen interpretation of QM, as well as the harsh debate that Popper entered with the school of Jauch. In this regard, although it is perhaps not too well known to a vast public, a number of works in the literature at least mention that Popper published, in 1968, a critical paper entitled Birkhoff and von Neumann's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which appeared in the prestigious journal Nature (Popper, 1968) . What was, however, hitherto not known is that such a paper was just the tip of the iceberg of what Popper himself referred to as "a greater enterprise directed against the new quantum logic". 3 From early 1968, indeed, Popper devised a series of formal proofs on lattice theory, aiming at disproving the interpretation derived from Birkhoff and von Neumann's pioneering paper, and in particular its justification of the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Although most of this effort turned out to be based on misconceptions of the original work -and Popper later distantiated himself from some of his criticisms of the LQM 4 -I deem this case study remarkable for at least two reasons:
On the one hand, it helps to shed light on the interplay between philosophers and physicists on the ground of foundations of QM, and in particular, on the peculiar role played by Popper at the edge between these communities (see further and cf. Del Santo, 2019) . In particular, I will provide new evidence of his forgotten endeavour against the LQM (and the Copenhagen interpretation along with it), thanks to a number of new archival sources. Moreover, I will show that there exists proof of at least three unpublished papers authored by Popper (which I could partially retrieve).
On the other hand, I will address what has been called an "unsolved historical issue" (Venezia, 2003) , namely that Popper's only published paper on this topic (Popper, 1968) , despite appearing in the pages of Nature, did not receive any rebuttal in written form until as late as 1974. 5 On the contrary, I will show in detail how the enterprise against the revival of LQM undertaken by Popper led him to enter an intense period of debate with some of its leading proposers (J. Jauch, D. Finkelstein, A. Ramsay, J.
1 For a comprehensive reconstruction of Popper's engagement in the research on foundation of QM and his role in the community of physicists in that period see (Del Santo, 2019) . 2 This school comprised scholars such as C. Piron, J. P. Marchand, G. Emch, M. Guenin, B. Misra and others; see e.g. (Jammer, 1974) , pp. 351 ff. 3 Letter from Popper to Mario and Marta Bunge in April 1968. (PA, 94/4) . 4 In Popper's book on his mature views on philosophy of quantum theory (Popper, 1982) , the editor W. Bartley explicitly states that the parts on "'Birkhoff and von Neumann's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics' […] contain some points which Popper no longer upholds". 5 The only exception is of a succinct footnote in (Jauch and Piron, 1970) , see section 3.2. Pool). In particular, I retrieved an unpublished rebut of Popper's criticisms by Ramsay and Pool, which was submitted only a few months after Popper's paper appeared in Nature, but that was never eventually published. 6 This caused a tremendous controversy (see section 3.2), and I deem it of historiographical relevance to finally reproduce it (as figures in Appendix) after more than 50 years from its conception. 7 Before getting to the heart of the case we want to investigate, I will contextualize it by briefly recalling what was the status of the research on foundations of QM in that period, as well as Popper's engagement in that debate.
Intermezzo: Popper's role in the quantum debate
After an initial period, in the 1920s and 1930s, of heated interpretational debates (among eminent physicists the likes of Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger) on the newly established quantum theory, fundamental research experienced a dramatic setback. Largely due to the outbreak of World War II -that also led European physicists to spread around the world (especially in US)-the scientific practice drastically changed into a much more pragmatic enterprise. Fundamental questions were mostly substituted by practical problem-solving activities. The subsequent Cold War period did not change things back, and actually fostered pragmatism in physics, leading to the emblematic expression "shut up and calculate!" (see Kaiser, 2011) . It was only from the 1960s that a few physicists started breathing new life into fundamental research in QM, voicing the view that the fundamental and the interpretational problems were far from being resolved. In his comprehensive work, O. Freire Jr. calls this generation of physicists "the quantum dissidents" (Freire, 2014) . Among them stand the names of J. Bell, H. Everett, D. Bohm, J.-P-Vigier, F. Selleri (see also Baracca, Bergia and Del Santo, 2016) .
The reason to call them dissidents is twofold: on the one hand, they fought against their Zeitgeist to bring back foundation of QM into the focus of physics proper (as opposed to regard them as "philosophical trivialities"); on the other hand, their main goal was to demolish the hegemony of the Copenhagen interpretation, which, also due to its instrumental approach, became the way of presenting quantum theory without introducing further philosophical issues. On the contrary, the mentioned dissidents strove for bringing back (some forms of) realism into quantum physics, which had been challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation. It ought to be recalled that John Bell put forward the theorem that bears his name in 1964, but that result went basically unnoticed for over a decade. Today Bell's paper (Bell, 1964) has some 13300 citations and it lays at the basis of the fortunate novel fields of quantum information theory, quantum computation and quantum cryptography. Yet, such was the status of theoretical quantum physics in the 1960s, a formal tool that allowed scientists to make calculations. Karl Popper, who had been already involved in the foundations of quantum mechanics in the 1930s -when he proposed a mistaken Gedankenexperiment that however brought him into discussions with Bohr and Einstein-came back to such problems at the beginning of the 1950s. At that time he devised his propensity interpretation of probability that was eventually to have a long-lasting influence on the physics community. However, as recently reconstructed in (Del Santo, 2019), Popper was throughout all of the 1950s mainly active into the circles of philosophers of science and his resonance 6 The existence of this paper is also acknowledged by (Jammer, 1974) , and by (Dalla Chiara and Giuntini, 2006) as the only rebuttal of Popper's criticism intended for publication. However, none of these authors ever had the opportunity to get a copy of the paper, and Ramsay and Pool themselves do not have retained a copy of their note (communications to the author on May 15 th and September 7 th , 2017). 7 In order to present these results, I have conducted a research at Popper's Archive (PA in the references) in Klagenfurt, Austria. The reproduced note was enclosed in a letter from Pool to Jauch on February 19 th , 1969, and forwarded to Popper (PA 96/18). in the physics community was close to nothing, even among those dissidents who were already rethinking the foundations of QM. It is interesting to notice that some of Popper's philosophicallyinclined acquaintances among the physicists -such as Herman Bondi, Alfred Landé and David Bohmconsidered him, in the 1950s, as a reference point to ask for assistance and advice to publish their ideas into journals on the philosophy of science. A major turning point happened in mid-1960s -mainly thanks to the promotion of Wolfgang Yourgrau, Henry Margenau and Mario Bunge-and gave Popper the visibility to get into the sphere of influence of the quantum dissidents. From that time on Popper's role changed tremendously, and it can be claimed that he became a fully-fledged quantum dissident, in the sense of being active and influential (i.e., participating in their meetings, publishing in their specialized journals, etc.) in the community of physicists concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics.
His international fame as a philosopher and his deep conviction in scientific realism led him to be a central node in the network of these physicists, and he would never lose this status until the end of his days (see Del Santo, 2018 ). Popper's critique of LQM is thus to be considered, together with his paper Quantum Mechanics without the Observer (Popper, 1967) , as the main activity that gave him the necessary momentum to cross the disciplinary boundary of philosophy and enter the fight on the foundations of QM on the same ground of the professional physicists. Despite most of his original contributions to quantum physics have turned out to be faulty, his long-standing bridging role between physics and philosophy is to be considered a non-negligible factor in bringing foundations of QM back into proper physics.
The Logic of Quantum Mechanics
In order to introduce the historical case, I shall start by giving a short overview of what LQM is about (in this section), and sketching Popper's arguments against it (in section 3.1). 8
In formal mathematical logic, an algebra (L, ˅, ˄) on a set L of binary variables is Boolean with respect to the connectives conjunction (˅) and disjunction (˄), if the following properties hold: commutativity, associativity, existence of the absorbing element, idempotency, existence of maximum and minimum, existence of the complement and distributivity. This latter property states that, given elements x, y, z ∈ L, x ˅ (y ˄ z) = (x ˅ y) ˄ (x ˅ z).
Propositional calculus links these formal properties of mathematical logic to the observables of physical systems, namely it deals with empirical propositions and what structure of the logical connectives that relates them is compatible with the observed phenomenology. In this context, an empirical proposition is defined as a binary, decidable statement about a physical system, also called a "yes-no experiment": "these are observations which permit only one of two alternatives" (Jauch, 1968) .
To illustrate this, let us start with classical physics. In classical (Hamiltonian formulation of) physics, the state of a physical system moving in the three-dimensional space is characterized by a point in the (position-momentum) phase-space ~ℝ 6 . An observable Ω is a real-valued function on this phase-space, such as position, momentum, or the total energy. Given this framework, an empirical proposition is a binary statement about the value of a certain observable in the following form: "The measured value of the observable Ω lies in the interval [x, y], with , ∈ ℝ". Clearly, the answer is either "yes" or "no".
Note that any physical quantity can then be reduced to a collection of empirical propositions (possibly infinite, in the case of continuous variables or unbounded degrees of freedom), dividing the "observational" domain into intervals. These empirical propositions can then be combined using logical connectives and propositional calculus investigates what structures are compatible with the theory under consideration.
In particular, in his famous Foundations of Quantum Theory -the first comprehensive manual of propositional calculus-Jauch shows that the propositions of a physical system (both in classical and quantum physics) form a complete, orthocomplemented lattice. 9 He then clarifies the distinction between formal logic and the calculus of empirical propositions: the calculus introduced here [i.e. propositional calculus] has an entirely different meaning from the analogous calculus used in formal logic. Our calculus is the formalization of a set of empirical relations […] . It expresses an objectively given property of the physical system. […] The calculus of formal logic, on the other hand, is obtained by making an analysis of the meaning of propositions. It is true under all circumstances and even tautologically so.
[…] It turns out, however, that if viewed as abstract structures, they have a great deal in common." (Jauch, 1968, p. 77) It is, therefore, possible to directly exploit results and theorems of formal logic and adapt them to describe the structure of physical systems. In particular, it is possible to show that the structure of the possible compositions (through logical connectives) of empirical proposition in classical physics form a Boolean algebra, as defined above.
On the contrary, the momentous paper by Birkhoff and von Neumann of 1936 proved that for compositions of quantum empirical propositions the law of distributivity fails. In such a way, the structure of experimental propositions would still be an orthocomplemented lattice, though not a Boolean one. The reason for weakening the classical logical structure was rooted in (the orthodox interpretation of) Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, which imply a violation of the principle of the excluded middle for experimental propositions. Indeed, in quantum mechanics, even for maximal pieces of information about a system (pure states), the full information about one observable (e.g. "spin along x-direction is up"), does not allow to decide the truth state of a second non-commuting observable (e.g.
to decide on the truth of the experimental proposition: "spin along the y-axis is down"). Birkhoff and von Neumann, indeed, noticed that the distributive law "is a […] logical consequence of the compatibility of the observers." (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936) . Under this evidence, they proposed to substitute the distributive law with the weaker modular law, i.e., ((x ˄ z) ˅ y) ˄ z = (x ˄ z) ˅ (y ˄ z). 10
Popper's rebut of Birkhoff and von Neumann
Popper had a formal education in logic (and some in mathematics and physics), and started working on problems of lattice theory as early as 1938. 11 As a consequence of the popularity that LQM was gathering -an approach firmly in the spirit of the operational Copenhagen interpretation, since it elevates Heisenberg's uncertainty (in its standard interpretation) to the fundamental principle -Popper was called to vindicate his standpoint. He thus published his mentioned paper in Nature (Popper, 1968) , wherein he claimed that Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal was untenable, due to an alleged mathematical mistake made by the two preeminent mathematicians (Popper's paper is a formal paper on lattice theory). In Popper's words: "no more than a simple slip -one of those slips which, once in a lifetime, may happen even to the greatest mathematician" (Popper, 1968 ).
Popper's proposal is based on three arguments of rather different nature: an algebraic one, a probabilistic one and a Gedankenexperiment. Popper's first argument goes like this: Birkhoff himself proved in his book Lattice Theory, in 1940, that every orthocomplemented lattice is a Boolean algebra provided it is uniquely complemented. Popper notices that orthocomplementation is usually taken to be unique, and that "Birkhoff and von Neumann constantly speak of 'the' complement and 'the' operation of complementation", and thus he infers that the complement was implicitly assumed to be unique by the authors. Thus, Popper concludes that Birkhoff and von Neumann's paper "culminates in a proposal which clashes with each of a number of assumptions made by the authors" (Popper 1968 However, all of Popper's later critics (including Scheibe, 1974; Venezia 2003; Dalla Chiara and Giuntini, 2006) agree that rules (R1)-(R4) represent a strengthening of the original assumptions of Birkhoff and von Neumann, and do not translate correctly their original proposal. The aim of the authors was, in fact, to avoid characterizing any probabilities at all, but merely resorting to a dimension-function m. Scheibe noticed that "R4 combined with R2 leads to a very strong axiom system of probability" (Scheibe, 1974) , and Birkhoff and von Neumann were fully aware that this would have inevitably lead to the collapse of their proposal back to a Boolean algebra. Popper will eventually accept this point thanks to the interaction with S. Kocher in 1974 (see section 3.2).
At last, Popper questions the validity of a Gedankenexperiment devised by Birkhoff and von
Neumann as a physical justification to challenge the law of distributivity. Denote by x the experimental observation of a quantum wave packet on one side of a plane and by x' the observation of the same packet on the other side of the plane. Call y the observation of the wave packet in state symmetric with respect to the plane, then Birkhoff and von Neumann maintain:
This expression shows that the equality between the first and the last terms does not hold, and thus the distributivity law breaks down. However, Popper maintains that there is nothing quantum in this example and that "we may substitute an elephant […] for the wave packet". In fact, he claims, x' is not to be interpreted as the property of being "in the other side of the plane", but rather as "not being on the one side". In such a way, y = x ˄ y and the equality is restored (and as such also distributivity). To my knowledge, nobody successfully rebutted this part of Popper's criticism, because, in Scheibe's worlds, 12 In (Popper, 1968) , rule (R4) reads instead: for every m, m(x) + m(y) = m(1) + m(x ˅ y), due to a misprint. Indeed, Popper found the mistake only after the paper was published and sent the correction to the misprint to several physicists and philosophers (see section 3.2) on October 8 th , 1968, (PA, 96/1). It ought to be remarked that both Scheibe (1974) and Venezia (2003) noticed the mistake, but the latter corrected it the wrong way, namely substituting m(0) for m(1).
"it has to be admitted that the passage to which Popper refers in this connection is very ambiguous." (Scheibe, 1974) . The Gedankenexperiment that Popper criticize is, in fact, perhaps the weakest part of the original Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal, for it is more connected to the physical interpretation of the formalism than to the any possible mistake made by the two mathematicians.
The fact that Popper's thesis is completely self-consistent has hardly been questioned, but it is the opinion of most of his commentators (see e.g. Venezia, 2003 and Dalla Chiara and Giuntini, 2006) that Popper misinterpreted Birkhoff and von Neumann, who have, in fact, never intended to assume the unicity of the complement. Also Scheibe, in his critical reply to Popper, affirmed "that two mathematical arguments of Popper, valid as they are, rest on interpretative premises completely without foundation in the position actually held by Birkhoff and von Neumann" (Scheibe, 1974) , and he pointed out that they could not have assumed a unique complement, since already in "von Neumann's lectures […] given in the academic year 1935-6: There irreducibility is characterised as stating that apart from the two neutral elements of a lattice no element has a unique complement". It has also been stressed in (Venezia, 2003) and (Jammer, 1974 ) that Birkhoff and von Neumann's paper is definitely not an example of clarity and actually contains a number of ambiguities and it is indeed necessary to resort to other works of the same authors (as also Scheibe did), or to successive developments by others, to ultimately prove Popper wrong.
In any case, we are here concerned with a case that, from the genuinely historiographical point of view, is a really peculiar one. In fact, it has been stressed that Popper's paper against LQM "represents a real issue of history of science" because "one would have expected a strong reaction by the upholders of this approach." (Venezia, 2003) . However, Popper's refutation of the LQM was rebutted only six years later by the already mentioned paper of Erhard Scheibe, Popper and Quantum Logic (Scheibe, 1974) . Venezia rightly pointed out that, even if Popper would have been trivially wrong -which he does not think and neither does the present author 13 -"why not to answer publicly and demolish his thesis?
It should have been a scientific duty, and, given the high profile of the author, anyone would have gained popularity." (Venezia, 2003) . Although this historical episode has gone mostly unnoticed, Jammer's excellent book The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics documents the existence of a paper written by Alam Ramsay and James C. T. Pool (sent to Nature in October 1968) in order to vindicate the LQM and of a counter-reply by Popper (sent to Nature in February 1969). Jammer anyway concludes that "due to accidental but never fully clarified circumstances none of these papers, although obviously written for publication, has ever appeared in print." (Jammer, 1974, pp. 353 ). Jammer's reconstruction (partly based on the correspondence he had with Popper at that time) is factual and clean-cut, yet it does not tell the whole story. By means of Popper's correspondence and notes, it is now possible for the first time to give this unsolved historical incident a resolution. Two main new elements emerge: (1) Popper's critique of the LQM was not publicly rebutted but it stimulated an impassionate debate, which has never appeared in print (as I shall show, Ramsay and Pool's note became a substantial part of this debate).
Moreover, (2) Popper's paper in Nature was only a minor part of a vaster campaign that Popper conducted against the LQM in those years. 13 Popper was surely wrong in maintaining that the orthocomplemented modular lattice of Birkhoff and von Neumann was uniquely complemented. However, the lack of clarity in Birkhoff and von Neumann's paper played a major role in Popper's misinterpretation, which is anyway completely self-consistent. Moreover, I think, with Venezia, that Popper was right when he stated that Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal was missing a clear physical interpretation in terms of the uncertainty principle. Venezia also claimed that "it exists an objective difficulty in the literature to rebut Popper about his probabilistic interpretation of" Birkhoff and von Neumann. For all these reasons I think that one cannot affirm that Popper was trivially wrong.
A greater enterprise directed against the new quantum logic
As it was argued before, Popper's motivation for such an overdue intervention was rooted in the revival that the LQM was experiencing in the 1960s. Popper explicitly explained this to Bondi, in the letter that inaugurated his activities conducted against the LQM: This paper, which was eventually published as a general article (Popper, 1968) and not as a letter to the Editor, 14 was a summary of only one of the nine sections of which the long original paper consisted. Popper asserted that, "in fact, the letter to Nature overlaps not even marginally with the Popper also called Bohm at the telephone, who sent him an offprint of (Bohm and Bub, 1966) . About this paper we only have indirect evidence thanks to Popper's letters, but no copies seem to have survived. However, it is clear this is a different paper from the previous two, because Popper states, in the letters to the editors: "a paper of somewhat less than 5000 words" (PA, 96/2); whereas the paper in Nature was around 2800 words long and the one submitted to the Royal Society much longer (at least 21 pages). It was Popper himself who withdrew the submission of his paper from the International Journal of Theoretical Physics; on September 14 th , 1968, he wrote to the editor John Yates stating that "although this paper was much more detailed, its scope did not go beyond the outline that [he] gave on Nature", (PA, 311/40).
(PA, 94/5). With this, Popper aimed at throwing himself into an open debate over the mathematical foundations of quantum logic. However, mathematicians have completely ignored Popper's attack and even Birkhoff who was -together with von Neumann, who had however passed away in 1957-the main target of the whole enterprise against LQM, never answered any of the letters that Popper sent him. As we shall see in the next section, it was only the publication of the paper in Nature that triggered an intense debate with the school of physicists concerned with LQM.
It is now evident that what has gone down in history as an isolated incident was actually a minor evidence of a number of activities that Popper was organising, urging to stop the quantum logic approach. The table below lists all the manuscripts that Popper wrote against the LQM, and the additional documents related to them, none of which ever appeared in print with the only exception of (Popper, 1968) . As already recalled, it was particularly Jauch, who revived the interest towards Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal of a novel logic for quantum mechanics. Joseph Maria Jauch interest in philosophical issues. He was therefore among the first physicists, in the early 1960s, to revive the interest towards foundations, criticising "the pragmatic tendency of modern research [which] has often obscured the difference between knowing the usage of a language and understanding the meaning of its concepts." (Jauch, 1968) . In Geneva, Jauch established a prominent school of theoretical physicists whose research activities were often devoted to foundations of QM. However, Jauch's views were far from the ones of most of those dissidents who actively opposed pragmatism advocating a realist Copenhagen but was also a positivist of the kind that Popper abhorred, still supporting inductionism: 20 "Empirical truth […] is synthetic truth. The general physical laws are arrived at by induction from observed facts" (Jauch, 1968, p. 70 Reinsured, Jauch mitigated his criticism on March 3 rd :
Papers authored by Popper on the LQM
I am really sorry that I have given the impression of suspecting you of collusion to prevent criticism to your paper. What I really wanted is to hear from you that you had nothing whatsoever to do with Nature's rejection […] . All the blame for the confusion seems thus to fall on the shoulders of Nature levelling harsh criticisms which were at the core of the paper which was to be the first published rebut 23 The original text in French, reads: "Yourgrau m'a communiqué deux articles de vous sur l'interprétation de la Mécanique Quantique. J'ai constaté avec grand plaisir que vos idées se rapprochent beaucoup des miennes.". The second paper that de Broglie referred to in the letter is here (Popper, 1967) . (Scheibe, 1974 namely that the latter had made an additional assumption, i.e., the addition theorem for the probabilities.
The only rebuttal which appeared publicly a few months later was a footnote of a few lines in a publication by Jauch and Piron (Jauch and Piron, 1970) . Although Popper was already aware of it, as we deduce from his letter to Shimony, he was informed of the publication of such a note directly from Jauch only on September 3 rd , 1970. In the same instance, Jauch also took the opportunity to remind Coming back on the historical question on why Jauch had never publish a rebuttal of Popper's paper, limiting himself to a heated private correspondence, one can find an answer in the final words of the mentioned letter: "I still think the correction should come from you, since this is not an interesting subject for a debate, the point at issue being entirely trivial." (PA, 96/18). Also Popper put an end to this debate that lasted more than two years, without however solving the matter in a satisfactory manner for neither of the two parties. On September 28 th , 1970, he wrote the last letter to Jauch commenting the note recently appeared in (Jauch, 1970) : pointed out that Popper's argument is based on a "natural misunderstanding of a misleading statement 24 Together with Ernst Specker, Kochen had proposed the so-called Kochen-Specker theorem, an important no-go theorem for noncontextual hidden variables (Kochen and Specker, 1967) .
Conclusions
In this paper I have reconstructed the involvement of Popper in a number of activities conducted against the approach to foundations of physics, known as logic of quantum mechanics. I have shown in great detail that Popper's effort went far beyond the only short published article (Popper, 1968) , encompassing at least three more longer manuscripts (that I partly retrieved in the archives). Moreover, I showed that the expected but apparently missing reactions to such a criticism, actually happened in the form of a harsh debate through private correspondence with some of the major exponents of the 
